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Abstract
The article develops the thesis that a universal value basis for holistic education (Bildung) 
is provided by a plural moral system in which various ethical discourses are constructively 
interwoven. This is more successful for education and allows the individual a broader eval-
uation of alternatives in moral action. The plurality of a moral system supposes the pres-
ence of various ethical discourses, including the ethics of human rights (liberal discourse), 
the ethics of the common good (communitarian discourse) and the ethics of interpersonal 
relations (the ethics of care). In interweaving all three of these discourses in education, the 
teacher should use common sense, which we define as the power of judgement and a sense 
of community. This is followed by views on how to model organise educational practices 
that stimulate the creation of an ethically plural educational environment in open commu-
nication, where the learner develops the ability to make judicious decisions with regard to 
moral action without having to submit passively to common norms.
Keywords: human rights, liberal discourse, communitarian discourse, discourse of the 
ethics of care, the child as the medium of education, education as internalisation and as 
communication, autopoietic pedagogy
1. Introduction
The primary topic of pedagogy (Slovene: pedagogika; German: Pädagogik) is vzgoja. The 
Slovene term vzgoja is translated here as “education,” but it should be noted that we under-
stand vzgoja more as an approximation of the German category of Bildung1. Enquiry about 
education (Bildung) is the essence of pedagogical enquiry. Education (Bildung) is education 
1The English translation “education” will be followed by the German word Bildung in brackets in those cases where 
education is meant more as the formation of spiritual image (internalisation of an image of humanity or the social), but 
not where it is used as a common term or as a predominantly instrumental process (development of the capacities of 
judgement, evaluation, learning; sensibilisation of the emotions).
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(Bildung) for values par excellence. For values in different fields: aesthetics (the beautiful), 
ethics (the moral), science (truth), physical development (the body), sport, interpersonal rela-
tions, attitudes towards the self and others, attitudes towards nature, the economy and so 
on. The acquisition of knowledge and the development of abilities is somehow secondary, 
but nevertheless important, because knowledge substantiates and supports values. Without 
knowledge, education (Bildung) for values would be a naked ideological construct [1].
Pedagogy is conceived as a normative discipline. Without an answer to the question of what 
the goal of education (Bildung) actually is, it is blind as a science and unable to defend itself 
against the multiple influences through which various centres of influence and power attempt 
to win over young people in modern society. That is why values are so much in the foreground 
in pedagogy. In this article, we will first consider the goal of education (Bildung) on the basis 
of theoretical analyses of various ethical discourses in order to consolidate the theory of the 
importance of pluralism in the educational concept of the public school. We will conclude the 
article with a conceptual proposal for the implementation of educational practice, where we 
propose a model of differentiated moral communication through which an open space is created 
for moral judgement and decision-making on the part of the individual, who is at the same 
time encouraged to reflect on various fields of the moral: human rights, the common good and 
the quality of interpersonal relations. The differentiated moral communication model is based 
on numerous reports from educational practice prepared by students of educational sciences 
at the Faculty of Arts in Ljubljana over the last decade.
2. Inculcation of values or obligations towards the law
How to prepare young generations for life is a fundamental question of human evolution. 
No period and no civilisation have been able to avoid it. Every civilisation has approached 
the search for the right path in its own way, and numerous possibilities have developed, 
including some that have been controversial. Every period and every social community have 
traced its own paths, since education is a typical phenomenon of culture and cultural differ-
ences. This means that evaluating educational practices is never simple. It is only in the last 
half-century that children’s rights and human rights have started to be treated as an impor-
tant criterion for the assessment of educational practices. Regarding the aims of education, 
pedagogical theories still offer no clear answer as to what is more important when it comes 
to preparing the young generation for life: a vision of the future of society or an empirically 
clear conception of how to trace a path in such a way that the individual will be able to walk 
along it independently. Some pedagogical theorists devote far more attention to developing 
ideals, while others emphasise the young generation’s right to shape the culture of its own 
life. It may be that behind all the controversial possibilities that history has brought to our 
understanding of the education of the young, the most difficult question is whether the adult 
generation is entitled to decide on what path is right for the young generation. This is, in fact, 
the eternal question of what values in education should be based on. On the one hand, there is 
the awareness that we always decide on the education of children and young people with the 
perspectives of others, and it is therefore fair to think about what perspectives are best for the 
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young generation and what is good for the child [2]. On the other hand, there is the common 
good as a starting point. Plato illustrated this very dramatically in his allegory of the cave, out 
of which only a philosopher can lead us from imprisonment in the world of shadows towards 
the light that “is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful … and that 
anyone who is to act wisely in private or public must have caught sight of this” [3]. This path 
from the cave is the Greek paidea: education (Bildung) from slavery to humanity.
Two views of values are highlighted, leading to very different attitudes about the importance 
of the human being as individual. Plato understands value as valuable in itself. It is universally 
valid and the individual human being can add nothing to it. Mollenhauer, on the other hand, 
takes the perspectives of the young generation and the individual as a criterion, rather than 
universal validity. Value thus “arises” in a concrete discourse of existence. It is not definitively 
clear where the answer to the dilemma of Mollenhauer and Plato may lie. Even contemporary 
pedagogy, which adopts a different attitude towards the child from that adopted by traditional 
pedagogy, is unable to renounce offering young people ideals as a form of imagined excellences 
in the development of abilities and moral virtues. This striving towards excellence is supposed 
to be encouraged today by education for human rights [4]. Even when it comes to exercising 
human rights, it is never possible to be satisfied with what has been achieved, since societal 
practices show that the exercise of these rights is not self-evident, and there is no guarantee that 
the achieved state would be maintained without striving towards a better one. On the one hand, 
there are calls for pedagogy to give up the idealisation of educational objectives and replace 
them with realistic and realisable goals, and above all to build on the understanding of the child 
as a capable, rich being [5]. Even today, pedagogy has no true response to this alternative. On 
the other hand, the advocates of realism are increasingly rare among theorists, while the major-
ity continue to impose new and increasingly idealised tasks even on the modern school. It not 
infrequently happens that these tasks are mutually contradictory in their very essence.
The challenges of modern pedagogy also derive from the crisis being suffered by the sci-
ences that border on it and on which it has relied. Let us take Herbart’s Allgemeine Pädagogik 
from the early nineteenth century, on which the stable primary school practices of education 
(Bildung), teaching and learning were based for more than a century, until somewhere around 
the 1930s. This built on a widely held belief in the solid applicability of associative psychology 
and Kantian ethics. Today, on the other hand, proficiency in psychology is common to the 
many fields from which the various schools of thought about successful teaching and learn-
ing grow, and this in itself is a challenge. While a pluralism of views enriches the educational 
practices of teaching and learning, it leads to a series of difficulties in the field of education. 
Dilemmas for education also arise in the ethical field, particularly when ethicists, philoso-
phers and anthropologists talk about a decline in values, the twilight of ethics and morals and 
the loss of conscience and intimate personal soul-searching.
Can human rights fill the moral vacuum in modern society? It is true that they are conceived 
as a common ideal of all peoples, but their implementation in the legal system can cause prob-
lems, as we will see below. Will the law be able to substitute ethics and morals? With what con-
sequences? If we transfer the ethical criteria of public life into schools, we can expect schools to 
react to this and only prevent that which is prohibited by rules. In this way, education (Bildung) 
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would undergo a complete shift of paradigm: education for values would be replaced by the 
development of obligations towards the law and rules. We could characterise this is a paradox: 
school-based education for values without values, since legal norms form the field of con-
straint (discipline) and values the field of freedom (vzgoja – Bildung). Instead of awakening the 
internal voice of the conscience, school would reinforce the fear of punishment. When educa-
tion does not reach deeply into the interior of a person, it disappears as education (Bildung). 
But fear of punishment is already traditionally understood by pedagogy as disciplining, not as 
educating. To paraphrase Kant: discipline is a condition of freedom; it is only a condition, but 
freedom is only enabled to the subject by cultivation. Without education (Bildung), the process 
of humanisation of a human being is not possible. An alternative announces itself in the devel-
opment of the school: education or discipline? Successful education (Bildung) for values can 
of course be maintained if the school is based on a clear value system, which, with regard to 
criteria in public life, clearly means that ethical standards in the school must be higher than in 
civil society and commercial transactions. Immorality must not be permitted among students.
It should be pointed out that a lower tolerance of evil and the demand for higher ethical stan-
dards in schools and in public life trigger an enormous mass of problems. The question that 
raises itself is that of how to present higher life preferences to young people in schools when 
public experience shows them that envy, greed and shamelessness are becoming everyday 
emotions. How are young people supposed to accept higher ethical standards when they are 
constantly faced, in everyday life, with the facilely narcissistic ideology of a modern society 
that cultivates the belief that the individual should not be frightened of difficulties because 
the opportunities for social success and advancement are unlimited? Neoliberalism further 
strengthens narcissistic ideology, in that it satisfies ambitious interests and encourages the 
idea that every individual can create a position for themselves and acquire wealth, and that 
opportunities for advancement and social ascent will offer themselves spontaneously. In this 
logic, even education as a factor of upward social mobility has lost much of the lustre it still 
possessed during the expansion of education in the middle of the last century. This introduces 
further disquiet into schools. As Beck says, formal education may still be necessary, but it is 
no longer a sufficient condition to guarantee better employment and more prestigious jobs 
for all sections of the population. Modern society really does tell the individual that they can 
achieve everything, that everything is possible, but on the other hand, warns Beck, even the 
simplest glance at social reality, as revealed by simple statistics, shows that we are living in a 
risk society where opportunities for growth and prosperity are always matched by the equal 
possibility of collapse and destruction [6]. If we follow the idea of Risk Society, we find that 
the expansion of education is merely a product of neoliberal logic. Society offers opportuni-
ties for education to everyone, which strengthens the idea of the success of the individualistic 
society more than it provides realistic life prospects. In the end, however, the individual is 
also to blame for collapse and unfortunate circumstances in life. The “society of possibilities” 
is thus at the same time a “society of risk.” This is a consistent derivation of neoliberalism. 
The individual is ultimately to blame not only for their social rise but also for their fall. The 
state offers fewer and fewer guarantees and there is increasing indifference towards citizens’ 
rights. Social rights are somehow pushed to the margin, including the right to education. 
Expressions of cynical indifference include non-binding constitutional provisions that are 
New Pedagogical Challenges in the 21st Century - Contributions of Research in Education76
supposed to resolve the question of social inequality and selectiveness in education2. All this 
is merely proof that there is insufficient willingness in politics to address the problems of 
inequalities in society, which for schools and the education (Bildung) of modern youth is a 
serious burden.
3. Ideological uniformity, emancipation and the plural community
The more frequent questions of the modern theory of education and educational practice are 
those deriving from difficulties related to pluralism. In one way or another, all the dilemmas 
of education, in particular, those that revolve around values and, consequently, authority, are 
tied to pluralism. Pluralism has always represented a problem for pedagogy. In traditional 
pedagogy, which derived from religious and philosophically and ideologically unitary views, 
pluralism was “guilty” of educational ineffectiveness, since this pedagogy believes that the 
more uniform the education (in terms of views and values), the stronger its educational effect. 
Cultural pluralism and, in particular, the pluralism of values and views, was believed to cre-
ate a confusion that reduces the clarity of the educator’s messages and preferences and thus 
dilutes the effectiveness of the educator’s endeavours.
The question is: can pedagogy theoretically justify pluralism as its ideal? This would have 
been impossible even in the middle of the last century. Education (Bildung) in the spirit of 
the historically tried and tested 2000-year tradition and classical European culture was the 
only framework that filled teachers with confidence in the effectiveness of education (Bildung). 
The provocative new elements born of the art of the first half of the last century could not 
get through the school door. Not even critical pedagogy accepted the idea of pluralism, in 
the sense of cultural pluralism, as its central aim. Critical or emancipatory pedagogy (both 
terms were used by mid-twentieth century German theorists such as Wolfgang Klafki, Klaus 
Mollenhauer and Herwig Blankerz) was in fact tied to the critical theory of society and defined 
the goals of education as the formation of the mature, critical and emancipated subject [2]. 
Within critical theory, however, Horkheimer’s investigations showed that emancipation can 
also be a mistaken educational goal. Horkheimer developed the concept of emancipation in 
two mutually incompatible senses. First, he defined emancipation as a behaviour (Verhalten) 
oriented towards the liberation of the human being from dependence on irrational social 
mechanisms and pressures. In this interpretation, emancipation is the central positive message 
of the critical theory of society. The aim of emancipation is to rearrange the irrational and ideo-
logical mechanisms of social cohesion into a free arrangement of the life of society founded on 
reason [7]. Emancipatory pedagogy did not highlight this social dimension of emancipation in 
its interpretation of the aim of education, as may be understood from the above quotation from 
Mollenhauer. Instead it understands emancipation individualistically, as the opportunity for 
2The constitutional provision that put an end to the fierce political debates about social selection in the Gymnasium 
system of upper secondary education is a true caricature: “A child’s aptitude, interests, performance and inner calling 
shall be authoritative for his/her enrolment in a school rather than the economic and social position of the child’s par-
ents” (Constitution of the Free State of Bavaria, Article 132). This is reminiscent of the caricature of justice and equality 
expressed long ago by Anatole France: in a democracy, it will be forbidden for both rich and poor to sleep under bridges.
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individuals to freely realise their life prospects. Horkheimer later observes this goal in the con-
text of the study of negative dialectics and distances himself from it. Because individualistic 
emancipation really means, first of all “an enormous extension of human control over nature 
… which finally becomes an obstacle to further development and drives humanity into a new 
barbarism that ends in an irrational system of division of human domination over nature, 
in which, within the social organism, man’s domination over nature is reproduced as man’s 
domination over man” [8]. Horkheimer thus understands emancipation as an ambivalent phe-
nomenon that is realised in opposing value dimensions, and thus talks about “benign” (gutar-
tige) and “malign” (bösartige) emancipation. The process of emancipation in society always 
contains the risk of “benign” emancipation being reduced to “malign” emancipation.
A critique of the individualistic understanding of emancipation is also offered by Hannah Arendt. 
I cite her because she shows how emancipation can oppose pluralism. In her opinion, the auton-
omy of the individual is the myth of the atomised modern society, since “sovereignty, the ideal 
of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership, is contradictory to the very condition of plu-
rality. No man can be sovereign because not one man, but men, inhabit the earth” [9]. Arendt 
accepted pluralism as a fundamental characteristic of human existence and action, since “to be” 
means “to be among men” [9]. In her opinion, a unitary ideological system represents the same 
threat to plurality as an atomised modern society and moral individualism. We will encounter 
this question once again when considering the problem of individual morality (which we shall 
analyse in the context of the implementation of human rights within the legal order) and will 
arrive at similar conclusions. Arendt’s vita activa is conceived as an anthropology that defines the 
three key aspects of the human condition: labour, work and action. It is action that is the essence 
of human existence. Within it, we might also seek important implications for the modern under-
standing of education. For an individual, as Arendt puts it, can live in society without ever doing 
anything or even creating anything, but cannot live without acting [9]. Action for her means 
a sign of integration between people, and it is in integration that the essence of pluralism lies. 
That which takes place between individuals always points to their uniqueness, diversity and dif-
ference. Pluralism is a substantive point of human existence. Plurally understood interpersonal 
integration is the core of all other integrations, including the integration of customs and values.
4. The educational power of the content of values, social context and 
formal moral principles
Pluralism is thus in a certain sense a solution even in the postmodern era, where, on the one 
hand, education is pushed into an amalgam of competences, while on the other there is talk 
of the twilight of ideologies and values. This provokes the question of how, in such a society, 
to plan education in accordance with the categorical requirements of classic moral principles 
such as the Golden Rule (do unto others as you would have them do unto you). Elster posits 
the question even more radically. How should I respect the golden moral rule if I can reason-
ably expect that acting in accordance with this rule will not be reciprocated? Is the individual 
obliged to act morally in situations when others do not? Does this not also nullify my obligation 
in respect of the moral law? What answer does pedagogical theory give? We cannot but agree 
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with Elster that “the moral obligation in such cases may be quite different from what it would 
be on the assumption of universality of moral behaviour” [10].
Deriving from Elster’s question is the currently extremely widely held opinion that it is simply 
not possible to understand a value correctly if we do not place it into a real context. The impor-
tance of real context for moral decision-making is greater than an abstract moral principle or 
value. That is why moral education today cannot close itself in the safe framework of the tra-
dition of 2000-year-old values. Much has changed even in the way we talk about morals and 
moral education. Even in everyday speech and theoretical discussions, a certain discomfort 
can be sensed when we talk about “morals” or “moral education.” The very phrase “moral 
education” sounds patronising and archaic. It contains no hint of the autonomy that, for the 
morally mature individual, is something as self-evident as the universality of moral principles 
or values. That is why, rather than about “moral education,” we prefer today to talk about 
“formation of the moral self-image,” in this way hoping to express the point of our previous 
reflection, namely that we understand the formation of the moral self-image far more broadly 
than moral instruction or a moral lesson. In the foreground, we place the educator’s task of 
awakening in the child an awareness of the context of moral action, so that they become sensi-
tive to the feelings of others, make independent and considered decisions about their actions 
and, finally, create and define their own personal ideals. This, however, requires a change in 
the way we view the importance of the content of values. As we will see later, formal moral 
principles (for example, the Golden Rule, Kant’s categorical imperative, Aristotle’s doctrine of 
the mean) are more important for the development of moral self-image than the content of val-
ues. The formal moral principle, in the words of Renata Salecl [11], is a substantively “empty 
universal idea… that can perform an affirmative and critical function” in the moral decision-
making of the individual. Because of its “emptiness,” it has a universal character and in every 
context enables a judgement that is the basis for a duly weighed moral decision. It might be 
better to talk about the “self-formation of the moral image” than about formation of the moral 
self-image. Here the emphasis on the activity of the individual is even greater and induces 
pedagogical reflections on our willingness to completely change our view of the process of 
socialisation and to talk instead about self-socialisation or self-education. It is of course worth 
being cautious about this idea, since it verges on the known phenomena of those free schools 
which the environment has proved unable to accept because they have slid into an anarchic 
educational style when teachers have been unable to respond productively to the freedom of 
the children. The schools that have been able to do this have been successful, as demonstrated 
by, among others, the classic case of Summerhill, the boarding school founded by A. S. Neill.
Among the attempts to enable pedagogical theory to go beyond the paternalistic orientation of 
moral education is the substitution of the expression “moral” with the expression “prosocial.” 
Prosociality brings three important advantages to the theory of socialisation: (a) it highlights 
the importance of social situation or context, (b) it places the learner in an active relationship 
and, most importantly, (c) it places the experiential learning of moral relationships, practices and val-
ues in the foreground [5]. Compared to moral instruction, persuasion, example and other meth-
ods of traditional paternalistic moral education, prosociality is a highly complex phenomenon. 
For example, it also inherently includes the practising of various virtues such as participation, 
tolerance, cooperativeness, support for common goals and sensitivity in interpersonal relations.
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The problem, however, is that it is not possible to unconditionally ascribe to the principle of pro-
activity the universality that applies to moral principles such as the Golden Rule. It is a similar 
situation with responsibility. In the case of responsibility, it is necessary to ask “responsibility to 
whom and for what,” and in the case of proactivity, we have to ask “proactivity with whom and 
in what.” Responsible (proactive) cooperation in an immoral action—in fraud, for example— is 
immoral. The essence of the moral thus cannot be defined either by responsibility or by proac-
tivity. The same applies to other values such as freedom and justice. In reality, moral dilemmas 
are not clarified for us by values or their content. The response to dilemmas is to think about the 
quality of the objective that the individual is attempting to achieve responsibly, proactively and 
fairly. It follows from this that it is not possible to conclude directly from the content of a value 
whether a moral decision is good or bad. It is, for example, difficult to say in an absolute sense 
what is just. Lempert [12] thinks that expressing a negative assessment, in other words defining 
what is not just, is easier than assessing what is just. The value of justness, for example, becomes 
relevant in the case of an apology for or criticism of social inequality. But who in society should 
be the measure of what equal treatment or equal access to social goods actually means? May 
we (or should we) consider equity in access to goods on the basis of how this is experienced by 
those sections of society that feel discriminated against or underprivileged?
Numerous discussions also draw attention to the fact that in the case of education for values it 
is necessary to take into account the nature of different values. Oser and Althof [13] believed 
that fundamental values should be given a special place in education compared to concrete 
values. Concrete values (possessing a toy, visiting a friend, helping the poor) should be pref-
erences which can be established through observation of a concrete individual in concrete life 
circumstances and which may therefore be exposed to constant judgement. This also resolves 
to a certain extent the question of sensitivity to context. The problem, however, lies with 
fundamental values. In the opinion of Oser and Althof, it is not possible to understand these 
values when we are thinking of something concrete, and it is therefore simply not possible to 
judge them in concrete situations because, by their nature, they have universal value. This is a 
question that is also triggered in the case of human rights. On the one hand, they demand con-
crete engagement, while on the other, as commonly universal rights, they are not sufficiently 
transparent, particularly when it comes to their mutual hierarchy, when, for example, insults 
and hate speech are propagated in the name of the right to freedom of speech. Fundamental 
values (responsibility, justice, freedom, equality) should be able to be proved by intercultural 
studies, by the fact that some values are above concrete values and also above culturally spe-
cific values and we are able to attribute them the same moral criteria everywhere [14] stand 
these values when we are thinking of something concrete, and it is therefore simply context. 
According to Oser and Althof, taking context into account in the education process could, in 
the case of fundamental values, lead to a relativisation of values and to a dilution of them that 
would make it impossible for young people to adopt a value as something that is their own 
and they accept as a value towards which they strive for its own sake.
Attention is also drawn to the different position of “values” in education by the theory of social 
domains, which distinguishes between the moral and conventional domain and the domain of 
personal choice [15, 5]. This theory recommends that schools act differently in relation to the dif-
ferent domains. They should deal more tolerantly with personal choices and treat infringements 
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of conventional rules consistently, in accordance with the rules, while moral domains require 
special treatment because of their complexity. They contain norms on which the agreement 
(non-violence) that applies to conventional norms is not possible. The critical point of the theory 
of social domains perhaps lies in the actual classification of domains, above all in the danger that 
differences in the treatment of domains are absolutised into a didactic rule and, as a result, less 
attention is devoted to consideration of context in education.
Modern theories offer no concrete new answer to Elster’s question of how we should act when 
we cannot expect reciprocity of moral action. The theory remains at the level of a warning to 
give careful consideration to context. We do, however, find an answer from the past, one that 
is precisely 101 years old. On the last page of his Democracy and Education, right at the end of 
his reflection, Dewey writes: “The something for which a man must be good is capacity to 
live as a social member so that what he gets from living with others balances with what he 
contributes” [16]. This formulation is somewhat similar to a categorical moral principle but in 
fact hypothetically expresses the requirement for proportionality in action. Elster’s dilemma 
is thus an old one and a part of the life of society in all civilisations. The appeal to propor-
tionality has always been a matter of the judgement and decision of the individual. Seminar 
students have frequently argued about whether Dewey’s proportionality principle is an invi-
tation to the morality of revenge, before finally concluding that it is an invitation to every-
one to act positively towards others even in unfavourable circumstances, since according to 
Dewey’s principle they can expect a positive response.
The pluralism of the modern age introduces a new characteristic to proportionality of action 
in that it also requires us to understand the customs and habits of other cultures and to rec-
ognise their moral code, before accepting a given action as immoral. Once again the idea is 
confirmed that moral activity cannot be understood simply and is not “learned” without wise 
judgement and sensus communis or “communal sense.”
5. The school and ethical pluralism
5.1. On ethical pluralism
Ethical pluralism needs to be explained in more detail, since I am thinking here not only 
of a diversity of values, but of something deeper, of the pluralism of ethical discourses or 
paradigms. If we follow the structure of ethical discourses used by Kymlicka in Contemporary 
Political Philosophy [17], we find that political philosophies are characterised by three ethical 
discourses: liberal (libertarian), communitarian and the ethics of care. I shall begin by giving 
a brief and general definition of all three discourses. The libertarian discourse places freedom 
and autonomy in the foreground. Its key value or virtue is justice, and human rights are its 
key civilisational achievement. Communitarianism places commitment to the community in 
the foreground. Its key value is the common good, within which social rights are fundamen-
tal values and solidarity is a fundamental virtue. The ethics of care is focused on the intimate 
sphere of life, on the quality of interpersonal relations, on a feeling of connection and human 
closeness. Its fundamental virtue is positive acknowledgement of one’s neighbour.
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In contemporary public life, politics and even theory, attitudes towards these ethical discourses 
are not balanced. The ethics of care is the discourse that is most frequently pushed to one 
side. It is often said that it does not belong to public life but to family, friendship and other 
intimate spheres. Infringements of human rights are manifold (migrants, poverty, precarious 
employment); social practices are woeful in terms of the realisation of human rights and are 
characterised by the interests of capital and the private and particular interests of various social 
groups. When it comes to values, it is not their content and message that are important but practice, 
in other words what we have really achieved on their basis. Can the blame for poor practices be 
attributed to an implementation of human rights into which specific ideological models of an 
atomised society are inscribed, models which cause an inadequate social reality and prevent us 
from creating a culture of justice and the safeguarding of human rights in society? At least two 
ideological models deserve to be exposed as such an obstacle: legal logic and moral individualism.
5.2. Human rights are not implemented in the legal order as ethical values but as 
legal norms
I shall analyse the above statement by looking at how the concept of human rights is posited 
in Slovenia’s Constitution, which, however, merely transposes constitutional solutions found 
in other European countries. Let us consider the following quotation from an interview with 
Jambrek, one of the fathers of the Constitution, published in a leading Slovene newspaper: 
“We were more interested in what to do with human rights [and] whether socio-economic 
rights belong in the chapter on human rights and fundamental freedoms. We unanimously 
agreed to consider as human rights and freedoms anything that is legally actionable. There 
are some ‘rights’ for which the individual cannot expect a court to approve their ‘claim’. We 
therefore referred to these ‘rights’ as ‘socio-economic relations’” [18].
Human rights are therefore legally codified and the ultimate responsibility for their under-
standing and interpretation lies with the court. This logic is also followed by the further legal 
instrumentalisation of rights in laws and other regulations at the state level and also at the level 
of rules within individual institutions, including in schools, in their own rules and regulations. 
This legal instrumentalisation of rights is, in my opinion, the origin of the incorrect perception 
of the role of rights in society, and precisely this perception has had numerous negative con-
sequences. Among other things, it has prevented a culture of human rights from establishing 
itself in society as the foundation of an overall social ethos applying to the whole of the life of 
society, in all public social practices, and also in mutual relations, in other words in private life.
In my view, the legal codification of the content of rights implicitly means a devaluation of 
their value core, which also results in a loss of their ethical dimension. The ethical dimension 
in fact presupposes my subjective truth and responsibility towards others and the world in 
general. In legal codification, on the other hand, my subjective truth has no value, and until 
the court makes its ruling it is not clear whether, in a given case, we can talk about an infringe-
ment of a right or not. This, however, excludes the importance of the conscience, both in moti-
vation for action and in judging that action. In judging an action or in the motivation for that 
action, the “silent inner voice” of the individual is therefore unimportant, since everything is 
ultimately dependent on how the matter turns out in the proceedings of formal judgements. 
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This is being demonstrated with increasing frequency by numerous cases at various levels of 
the life of society. Making decisions on infringement of human rights is sometimes too hard 
a nut to crack (in the sense of reaching a unanimous decision) even for Constitutional Court 
judges, who have the ultimate competence for the protection of human rights.
Naturally, though, we cannot conclude from the numerous inconsistent and contradictory 
legal decisions regarding human rights that the value system of human rights is empty 
and that we may arbitrarily fill it over and over again with experiences and concrete cases. 
Inconsistent decisions can only prove the vagueness and lack of transparency of the legal code 
of a right, but they say nothing about its value code. A concrete example illustrating the truth 
of this statement would be the September 2017 ruling of the European Court of Human Rights 
on whether a company monitoring private communications on workplace computers consti-
tutes an infringement of employees’ right to privacy [19]. The ruling adopted by the ECHR 
went against an earlier ruling by a Romanian court, yet even so was not an arbitrary decision. 
When making its ruling, the ECHR saw in the value of privacy a new dimension that inher-
ently belongs to the value of privacy but had previously been overlooked. According to the court’s 
judgement, this has the nature of a precedent, which means that it will be universally appli-
cable to all future cases. The essence of the problem lies in the fact that it took a court—and 
one of the highest instance—to arrive at a new understanding of the ethical in a right. How 
can we expect the full value core of a right to be perceived by a citizen, by a teacher or, last but 
not least, by a child? How then is it even possible to devise education (Bildung) in the spirit of 
human rights? Should education (Bildung) become the study of case law and thus be instru-
mentalised and lose its formative (Bildung) sense? What is the answer to the eternal question 
“is it possible to learn virtue?” Yes, it is possible, but virtue is not knowledge though without 
knowledge it is not possible. Someone who does not know that any action can be dangerous, 
that it is possible to evaluate it as both good and evil, will see no danger or evil anywhere, nor 
will they be sensitised to it. But this is not enough for the creation of a culture of human rights, 
since emotions, volition and sensitivity to moral action are of central importance in the devel-
opment of a culture. This can only be achieved in communication and only via intersubjective 
interpretations based on value judgements of actions, motives and intention.3
5.3. Human rights, moral individualism and the disproportion of rights and 
obligations
The liberal logic by which the safeguarding of rights is posited in the Constitution also contains 
a particular problem, namely the understanding of the relation of obligations and responsibili-
ties of the individual and the institution. Every right implies an obligation, but the question is: 
3In one seminar with students, we considered the case of the class teacher who wrote to the parents of all his pupils in-
forming them of the marks obtained by each pupil. This is an infringement of the right to the protection of personal data 
and also a criminal offence; regardless of the teacher’s purpose and motives for doing it. The dilemma which the seminar 
students attempted to answer was this: if a pupil discloses a classmate’s marks, have they also infringed the latter’s right 
to protection of personal data? They may have, but there are no sanctions in this case. In terms of the ethical assessment 
of such an action, the question of their motives remains open. An ethical dimension is thus established. The ethicality of a 
given norm (in this case the right to the protection of personal data) thus only arises in the relationship of two equal subjects and 
does not belong to the norm in itself.
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whose? Merely of the institution that is supposed to protect that right or can it also trigger the 
universal sense of obligation of every individual towards others? In this connection, Kymlicka 
recapitulates the position of Sandel and Taylor when they attribute moral individualism to lib-
eralism [17]. Moral individualism derives from the thesis that rights take precedence over all 
other moral concepts such as obligations, the common good, civic virtues and personal virtues. 
Moral individualism understands the individual as the basic unit of moral value, which means 
that it requires the derivation of the duties of higher units (the community) from obligations 
towards individuals. In this way, the burden of duty is essentially shifted from the individual 
to institutions. This is the impression created by constitutional solutions, namely human rights 
and fundamental freedoms are only infringed by the institutions of formal power.
This liberal logic, however, has long-term consequences in the way it understands the origin 
of infringements of human rights and probably contains the kernel of the views of a certain 
section of the public, including teachers and educators, that only citizens have rights, while 
institutions only have obligations, at least as far as the rights of the individual are concerned. 
Similar views regarding the disproportion of rights and obligations also prevail among those 
working in education. It is true that among them we also find absurd views, for example, that 
students today have too many obligations, but the majority consider, more realistically and 
in accordance with the communitarian critique of liberalism, that there is a disproportion 
between the rights and obligations of the school and students/parents, because the school 
only has obligations while students/parents only have rights. This opinion, then, is not the 
arbitrary view of those affected, but rather has its theoretical basis in the communitarian cri-
tique of the liberal model of moral individualism, which has written itself into human rights, 
not into their nature, but into their implementation in the legal order. The liberal discourse 
and moral individualism simply cannot be accepted as universal in pedagogical reflection 
on the educational aims and educational concept of the public school. This platform is too 
narrow for education (Bildung) for values, because it forgets the sense of community and the 
quality of interpersonal relations between people in everyday interactions.
5.4. Communitarianism and solidarity in the creation of a just society of common 
good
So far, we have only touched on the theme of moral individualism in a single question, namely 
the question of what kind of relationship between the rights of the individual (student/parent) 
and the obligations of the institution (school) is created by the model of moral individual-
ism. We have shown how awareness of this issue is strategically important for the school, in 
particular, for the planning and implementation of the concept of education. Yet this ques-
tion does not clarify all the consequences, including some significant consequences, that moral 
individualism has for the school. More important for the recognition of weakness of doctrine 
of moral individualism than the question of who has rights and who has obligations is the 
question of whether important rights, values and virtues exist in society that are insufficiently 
recognised as a result of liberal discourse. Let us look once again at part of the statement of the 
former constitutional lawyer and co-creator of Slovenia’s constitution, Jambrek, in the inter-
view cited. Jambrek says “there are some ‘rights’ for which the individual cannot expect a court 
to approve their ‘claim’,” and that these have therefore “found their place in our Constitution 
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as  socio-economic relations” and not as rights. “The current Constitution, for example, talks 
about the social state, but this is not operationalised. Not even the Constitutional Court has 
occupied itself much with this principle to date” [18]. Thus, there exist outside the legal order, 
alongside individual human rights, certain special “rights” for which, under legal logic, lib-
eral discourse does not recognise the same status in society as is enjoyed by individual rights. 
The consequence of this is that individual rights take precedence over social rights in society. 
An even more radical conclusion is possible. This legal structure even negates social rights 
as rights, since it refers to them as socio-economic relations, in other words as an economic 
category. In this way, liberal ideology destroys the balance between human individuality and 
sociality. If we follow the communitarian critique, by adopting the principal of the primacy of 
rights, liberalism places other moral concepts (duty, common good) into the background [17]. 
A hierarchical relationship is established between individuality and sociality, the consequence 
of which is that sociality and social rights are necessarily marginalised in society. Not only that, 
but virtues that are important for the social society, and solidarity is in first place here, become 
mere ideals to be used for educational purposes or in the charitable campaigns of civil society 
and the public media. Yet politics, faithful to the logic of economising and balancing public 
finances, first intervenes in the social sphere. It therefore also has a constitutional basis in the 
fact that social rights are not rights but socio-economic relations. This empowers its moral posi-
tion, since it does not infringe constitutional social rights but rather, as some nonchalantly put 
it, is merely coordinating economic and social relations with real possibilities. In accordance 
with the liberal attitude towards individual or social human rights, the state pushes social 
issues to the margins and is not capable of eliminating even its own poverty. The marginalisa-
tion of the social and the preference given to individual rights is in essence a class issue. The 
state based on the rule of law plainly protects above all the category of individual human rights 
(we know how this works in practice), so when we talk about justice in society, references to the 
rule of law are an increasingly frequent mantra, while nothing is heard about the social state.
The hierarchy of the individual and the social is not theoretically justified, not least because it 
is impossible to realise individual rights in a socially unjust society, just as it is impossible to 
create a just society if the rights of the individual are not guaranteed. Extreme communitarians, 
among whom Kymlicka also includes Marxists, would claim that in a true community the prin-
ciples of justice are unnecessary and that justice is merely a remedial virtue [17]. It is thus only 
relevant in society because of the mistakes caused by an unjust social order. Some remarkable 
illustrations of this can also be found in former Yugoslav education policy. For example, the 
principle according to which only a unified (common) school is a fair school, while all forms 
of differentiation, heterogenisation and individualisation are unfair. The word “fairness” did 
not appear in education policy documents, and unity was a synonym for the fair school. On 
the other hand, pedagogy and psychology critically observed that the unified school cannot be 
fair because it neglects the individual and functions as a Procrustean bed. Unsuccessfully. For 
more on this, see Medveš [20]. The theory of justice as a “remedial” virtue can even explain 
the illusion of socialist ideology that, thanks to the “just social system,” human rights are not 
necessary in such a society. This was a mask used to excuse infringements of human rights.
Kymlicka establishes an interesting dynamic of historical development between liberalism 
and communitarianism. “In the 1970s, the central concepts were justice and rights, as liberals 
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attempted to define a coherent alternative to utilitarianism. In the 1980s, the keywords became 
community and membership, as communitarians attempted to show how liberal individual-
ism was unable to account for, or to sustain, the communal sentiments, identities, and bound-
aries needed for any feasible political community” [17].
When it comes to school and education (Bildung), the hierarchy established by liberalism 
between individuality and sociality is a significant obstacle to the development of civic vir-
tues and the moral image of the young generation. Just as education subordinated only to the 
values of communitarianism, in other words only to the common good, would be one-sided, 
so education that only emphasises the principle of autonomy and individual freedom while 
ignoring communitarian values, the common good, equality, brotherhood and the coexistence 
of all people and coexistence with the environment and nature is one-sided education.
Thus, the liberal libertarian understanding of human rights cannot represent that universality 
that is supposed to provide the holistic education (Bildung) of the human being. It falls short 
in value terms when it comes to defining the aims of education. Social rights and the spirit 
of common good represent other obligations and virtues that cannot be derived from human 
rights as implemented in the legal order. From a systemically ethical point of view, it would 
be disastrous for the school to neglect or abandon the development of these values and virtues 
that encompass areas such as, as Galston puts it: social, economic, political and general social 
virtues. We tend to put solidarity in first place among fundamental social virtues, while in 
the opinion of numerous authors [21, 22] these also include virtues such as empowerment, 
loyalty (but not servility) and courage. In the economic sphere, they include virtues such as 
understanding social systems, knowledge of the frameworks of public finance, enterprise, 
technological innovation, knowledge about the ways in which crises develop and function, 
activity within various trends of economic movements and labour ethics; political virtues, on 
the other hand, include, for example, sensitivity to the state of rights in society, knowledge of 
the constitutional system, social participation and so on.
5.5. The ethics of care, a key value or virtue
The ethics of care could be referred to as the third ethical force to develop in the twentieth 
century alongside the ethics of justice and communitarian ethics. Its peculiarity is that it does 
not try to be rationally universalistic but instead seeks the origin of the moral in the context 
of interpersonal relations, since only a relationship of care causes a motivational shift towards 
one’s fellow human beings, which triggers moral judgement and reflection.
The ethics of care gives priority to “immediate proximity” [23] and is derived from the con-
text of relations rather than from formal values. Perhaps H. Arendt puts it best: “In so far as 
morality is more than the sum total of mores [and also rights – Author’s note], of customs and 
standards of behaviour solidified through tradition and valid on the ground of agreements, 
both of which change with time, it has, at least politically, no more to support itself than the 
good will to counter the enormous risks of action by readiness to forgive and to be forgiven, to 
make promises and to keep them” [9]. And, let us add, without referring to criteria that would 
be applied in the form of moral norms from outside.
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As it is impossible to reconcile liberalism and communitarianism, the ethics of justice and the 
ethics of care are irreconcilable [24]. Despite their universality, human rights, in their formalised 
and instrumentalised conception, simply do not reach into the intimate sphere of private life, 
where conflictual social situations, adultery, lack of love or compassion, abuse of trust, harm, 
humiliation and so on are not usually described in terms of infringements of someone’s human 
rights. This means that some other dimension appears in the regulation of private and, above 
all, intimate relationships, a dimension not encompassed by human rights. It is the sphere 
of values that cannot be characterised as just or unjust: friendship, love, respect, compassion 
and responsibility. The theorists of justice, or at least of its mainstream, have avoided treating 
and judging familial relationships with the criteria of justice: “Classical liberals, for example, 
assumed that the (male-headed) family is a biologically determined unit, and that justice only 
refers to the conventionally determined relations between families. Hence the natural equality 
they discuss is of fathers as representatives of families, and the social contract they discuss gov-
erns relations between families. Justice refers to the ‘public’ realm, where adult men deal with 
other adult men in accordance with mutually agreed upon conventions. Familial relationships, 
on the other hand, are ‘private’, governed by natural instinct or sympathy” [17].
Today, we have gone beyond the view that was voiced when the ethics of care first emerged, 
namely that it is an erroneous moral discourse in that it allows a separation of gender-divided 
moral perception and gender-divided morals. We have also gone beyond the opinion that the 
ethics of justice should apply to the public sphere and the ethics of care to the private sphere. 
In contrast to such a division, we can accept the opinion of Carol Gilligan and numerous femi-
nists that the ethics of care, though characteristic of private relationships, also has a public 
meaning and should also be taken into account in public life [24].
Theorists of the ethics of care draw attention to the importance of values or virtues that have a 
more emotional and intellectual basis, in contrast to the predominantly rational virtues of liber-
tarian and communitarian ethics. These include a sense of connection, one’s network of relation-
ships, proximity, nurturing relationships, sensitivity, compassion, empathy, loyalty, kindness, 
mutual assistance, moderation, solidarity, sympathy, care for others and, last but not least, the 
Golden Rule of ethics. Another of the fundamental virtues is recognition of the other, the different, 
as a human being. Recognition of the other is, in relation to every human being, something more 
fundamental, more elemental, which enables or establishes a relationship as a human relation-
ship. This is the acceptance of the other into a relationship, even though in a given moment 
we may hate them or resist them, though they fill us with compassion and are generally dif-
ferent from us. Recognition is the basis for heterogenisation, the opposite of domination and 
homogenisation. This is recognition and acknowledgement of the other as a human being.
6. Education as communication or education (Bildung) as 
internalisation
Teachers play an important role in combining different ethical discourses in educational prac-
tice. The teacher must be capable of ensuring, as a mediator in communication, the interweaving 
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of different value levels (justice, solidarity, recognition of the other). The teacher must organise 
educational communication in such a way that all three ethical discourses are constantly inter-
woven in it. Not so that the individual can imitate them but so that an awareness is gradually 
established of the fact that when making decisions in life it is necessary to reflect on different 
value orientations (justice, the common good and mutual relations), irrespective of which orien-
tation is eventually preferred in the individual’s decision in a concrete case. At the same time, the 
teacher must also establish the awareness that the decision taken by an individual is their own 
and that they must take responsibility for it. Whatever decision it is, they must stand behind it.
Previous consideration of values, particularly the values that are inscribed into human rights, 
has shown that at the level of implementation, without taking context into account, the con-
tent of no value or right is self-evident, and none has an a priori theoretical foundation. The 
true meaning of a value is comprehensible only in public discourse and not in my inner, inter-
nalised and subjective reflections that are limited unto themselves. Even for this reason, it is 
possible to doubt that education (Bildung) as internalisation could be effective. Internalisation 
suggests the passivity of the subject, an inner predeterminedness that, from the point of view 
of the goals of developing the autonomous subject, is anachronistic. We simply no longer 
expect the school to educate a biddable child. The fragility of human affairs, as H. Arendt puts 
it, requires an engaged approach, critical reflection and great sensitivity to social contexts [9].
The teacher must, then, be capable of guiding open moral communication. I have called this 
differentiated moral communication. It is important for the public school to communicate to every 
child, in the process of differentiated moral communication, an intellectual and emotional expe-
rience of the difference of value discourses, in order to develop their capacity for moral judge-
ment and teach them how to subordinate their affective moral inclination to rational moral 
judgement while taking into account the specific social context with all its emotional charges. 
The public school must endeavour to realise all the traditional aims of moral development, i.e. 
moral judgement (evaluation), moral feeling and moral wishing (will). But the first level—the capacity 
for moral judgement and for seeing the consequences of one’s own actions—is something that 
the school is obliged to achieve. This, if I may use an analogy, is the “minimum educational stan-
dard” that the school can contribute in the formation of the moral self-image of every student.
How do we conceive the interweaving of different value levels in differentiated moral commu-
nication? First of all, we emphasise that differentiated moral communication is not moral instruction 
and far less a moral lesson. Public reasoning, communicative rationality or public reasonable-
ness can be a successful methodical tool within pedagogical communication. The expression 
“public reasoning” or communicative rationality is used by Habermas in the sense of an activ-
ity that is oriented towards understanding (verstädigungsorientiertes) the functioning of society 
and has no instrumental connotation [25]. Kymlicka uses the phrase “public reasonableness” 
in a similar sense [17]. This activity takes the form of conversation about all the requirements, 
positions and views, and also all the actions, that relate to the rights of other human beings. For 
school purposes, the simplest way to present it is through the teacher’s mediation of the con-
versation with students about positions, views and their demands; needs or actions; disputes 
and conflicts. In public discourse, students should develop the ability to judge a concrete action, 
demand, belief and position from the point of view of different ethical discourses:
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• They must present their demand, position, view, action and dispute regarding another in 
a manner that is comprehensible to others (a reasonable definition of their ethical position).
• They must establish the justice of their demand in such a way that any individual in the 
same position would be entitled to make the same demand (the principle of the universality 
of rights).
• They must show that the realisation of their demand does not limit the other (the liberal 
principle: my freedom ends where another person’s freedom begins).
• They must establish that the quality of interpersonal relations will not be affected (the prin-
ciple of the ethics of care).
• They must indicate the impact on the community and the common good (the principle of 
sensus communis).
I use the term “mediative” for this mode of communication because of its association with 
mediation. Technically speaking, this is a method of discourse that has long been known in 
didactics as the Socratic method or heuristic style. Yet there is a small but significant difference. 
Socrates knew the truth and believed that anyone could arrive at the same truth by coming to 
know themselves. The mediator, on the other hand, even if he or she knows the truth, must lead 
to the discussion in such a way as not to influence the decisions taken by the participants. For this 
reason, the term “mediative communication” is more appropriate than “Socratic discourse.”
The “minimum standard” of moral formation compels the teacher to confront children with the 
values in their behaviour and accustoms them to moral communication. This is the obligation of 
the educational concept of public schooling, since otherwise it does not prepare people to face 
the difficulties of life and abandons them to cruel destiny. Whether this will result in the child 
harmonising moral judgement, emotions, will and behaviour with the common principles that 
he or she should follow is an entirely different question. There is simply no guarantee that dif-
ferentiated moral communication will ensure the lasting and emotionally full moral activity of 
the individual. The school contributes its part if it develops the ability to publicly confront argu-
ments and a culture of fact-checking, which is above all an important form of education against 
the manipulations to which the public is increasingly exposed. Today, various centres of power 
address the individual with fake news or encourage artificial needs of all kinds. Faced with all 
these influences, human choices are becoming increasingly limited, so the development of a 
culture of fact-checking is an increasingly important task in the education of young people.
The analogy of communication also applies when we think about younger children, includ-
ing those of preschool age. When a child does something that is not allowed, the practice 
that has established itself in some nursery schools whereby the child is told “now go and sit 
on the couch and think about what you have done” is a mistaken one. Here, too, commu-
nication is important. When dealing with a small child, we are not going to begin with the 
method of public reasoning. This will be introduced gradually, in a manner appropriate to the 
child’s age. We will begin with the communication of feelings, the stimulation of compassion 
and questions of what is right and what is wrong. The communication of feelings, however, 
should not be left halfway. It must be completed. Once again, we can take H. Arendt as a 
Education (Bildung) for Values
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.72450
89
model, in order to complete the conversation about how the child has done something wrong 
and how they have affected someone else, with forgiveness and a promise: “The possible 
redemption from the predicament of irreversibility – of being unable to undo what one has 
done though one did not, and could not, have known what one was doing – is the faculty of 
forgiving. The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is con-
tained in the faculty to make and keep promises” [9].
The moral system must remain open in education in order to establish, consequently, aware-
ness of responsibilities and duties. None of the moral levels in public reflection should be 
imposed on the student, and each should choose their own final decision. This is not a ques-
tion of application of any of the theories of self-regulation. Rather, it is about forming con-
sciousness, which is based on the simple fact that a moral decision in favour of a specific action 
can only be the free choice of the individual. Only in this way, it is possible to establish awareness 
of responsibility and from it develop awareness of moral obligation. Awareness of moral obliga-
tion cannot arise simply and directly through the transfer of the right of another, nor can it be 
imparted without establishing awareness of responsibility for one’s own actions in concrete situations.
Differentiated moral communication demands from the teacher a willingness to confront the 
objections of his or her students. Teachers do not establish their authority through an instant 
pedagogical measure, but authority can be established through wisdom and understand-
ing their students’ feelings during communication. Even a teacher’s admission that they are 
wrong does not in fact lessen their authority, it confers it. The old image of the authority of 
the teacher and the school has passed, never to return. The problem that remains is whether 
teachers are trained to act in unforeseen situations. Education is not in fact a causal process 
but a contingent one.
7. What pedagogical paradigms support ethical pluralism in the 
school and education as communication?
The question is a fundamental one. Of the four pedagogical paradigms that I have defined on 
the basis of our understanding of the medium of education [1], namely Herbartianism, human-
istic (geistwissenschaftliche) pedagogy, socially critical pedagogy and reform pedagogy, only 
two are still relevant today. Herbartianism declined after the First World War, while humanistic 
pedagogy did so after the Second World War. The only contrast that remains today is between 
socially critical pedagogy and reform pedagogy (Reformpädagogik), where the latter means, from 
the point of view of educational goals, a cross between education (Bildung) as internalisation 
and education as communication. In the socially critical paradigm, education (Bildung) is for-
mative and part of (deliberate) socialisation. Socialisation is understood as the “process of the 
transfer of the (symbolic) structure of society and the (necessarily and spontaneously) recipro-
cal process of internalisation of symbolic structures at the level of the individual” [26]. Social 
structure is created by real social conditions, which primarily forms the consciousness of the 
individual in accordance with universal value patterns. Education is necessary part of these rela-
tions and is always an expression of common or prevailing relations in society. The assumption 
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is that society is dominated by a “recognisable” symbolic structure, a kind of uniform teleology 
that enables identification. Consciously or not, it must be recognisable, since it is impossible to 
identify with the symbolically unrecognisable or it is possible to internalise it.
The medium of reform pedagogy is the child, the human being and the individual. In the last 
decades of the last century, the idea of the child as the medium of education developed within 
sociology, as part of systems theory [27], which gives it an entirely new meaning. According to 
Luhmann’s systems theory, society is composed of various functional systems (economy, poli-
tics, culture, education, healthcare, social services, justice, etc.) which, as they have evolved, 
have become independent of each other, with the result that in modern societies each of them 
functions as an independent system, according to its own preferences, rules and criteria. That 
which is right in one system as a main legitimate aim (e.g. financial efficiency in the economy) 
cannot be transferred as a main value to another system (e.g. financial efficiency in healthcare) 
without the latter losing its functionality [28]. The functionality of systems thus makes it impos-
sible for us to define the values of society as a whole in a uniform manner. For the purposes of 
building on our discussion up to this point, the most important thesis of systems theory is that 
all value systems are essentially particular, since they belong to functional social systems are not 
to society as a whole. This theory of Luhmann’s is recognised as theoretically productive even 
by critics of his other radical ideas in the field of education. It is, in fact, doubtful that it would 
be possible to re-establish a situation in which the development of society were subordinated 
to some overarching ideology or uniform teleology [29]. This leads to an important conclusion 
for pedagogy, namely that it is not possible to understand education as “fixing” the individual 
to common social norms, and it cannot be planned as a means for global social changes [30].
The way in which Luhmann understands the relation between the social and psychological is 
also important for our purposes. The traditional view of socialisation derives from the theory 
that the social is transformed through internalisation into the psychological. The transformation 
of the social into the psychological is not possible in systems theory, because the social system 
(communication) and the psychological system (consciousness) are two different functional 
systems. There is no possibility of mediation between the two systems [27]. In the classic theory 
of socialisation, the transformation (transfer) of the social into the psychological takes place 
with the help of internalisation. Internalisation is not possible in systems theory. Traditional 
pedagogical reflection, which is limited to the French Enlightenment, German idealism and 
neo-humanism, is, in Luhmann’s view, far below the level its own theoretical possibilities of 
analysing the problems of education and, above all, clarifying its belief in the causal relation-
ship between the social and psychological or, to put it in pedagogical terms, between the intent 
of the educator and the effect in the structure of the consciousness of the learner. According to 
Luhmann, then, pedagogy has never been capable of developing serious doubt in the possibil-
ity of realising the educator’s purpose. This is also reflected in the fact that it has used various 
constructs (pädagogischer Bezug—the pedagogical relationship, the pedagogical eros, internal-
isation) to explain educational effects that it has been unable to explain or justify scientifically.
Luhmann also holds the radical view that the task of influencing the formation of the system 
of consciousness via the system of communication is an unattainable and unfeasible task for 
education, since this would technically mean changing the structure of consciousness itself. 
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Consciousness is organised, in Luhmann’s view, as an autopoietic system that constantly 
builds on some initial point. But it cannot build itself without its own operations such as the 
ability to learn, memory and the idea of the future. In order to explain external influences 
on the consciousness, Luhmann uses the concept of the structural coupling of communica-
tion and consciousness. Consciousness participates in communication, but in each individual 
sequence it is autopoietically organised [31]. Within the communication process, each indi-
vidual responds to another in accordance with their own laws and with their own filters. We 
can thus only offer the child various alternatives for decision-making and, through commu-
nication, open up views of individual alternatives, without pushing any of them. Pedagogy 
should therefore replace the formula Bildung (the will to form) with the formula ability to learn 
[27]. We perceive the educator merely as a stimulator (or Irritation, to use Luhmann’s term) 
that, by providing a choice of alternatives, nevertheless sets the frameworks for what can hap-
pen. It is therefore important that the alternatives should be plural. The final decision is the 
individual’s decision whether to adapt to or resist the norms of reality.
Education is always the communication of all participants, not only of the educator and edu-
catee. This simultaneous action and effect of all participants (including those not present, 
thanks to the action of the memory) is the reason why it is not possible to control educational 
influences in communication. Not because of the multitude of influences, but because the 
child and everyone else involved in communication act as self-referential systems. This thesis 
of radical constructivism is the basis for Luhmann’s idea of education as self-socialisation. He 
derives it from the nature of human decision-making, rather than by adopting the principle of 
“freedom of choice.” It is simply the fact that, in the final consequence, the individual decides 
on their own pattern of behaviour, despite the social system and the individual being imbued 
with each other. The child is the medium of education, but only as a being capable of learning, 
able to connect its thoughts, feelings, memories, plans and ability to think about the future. On 
this basis, it can form higher levels of connection and build consciousness. This, however, is 
an internal process of consciousness that is not evident and cannot be overseen from outside. 
Revealing this internal process is not a matter for pedagogy but for the cognitive sciences [27].
8. Conclusion
There are no ideal solutions when it comes to the educational process. As the question of how 
to ensure adequate social contexts that guarantee the successful development of the individual 
in the community always remains open in the classic theory of socialisation, it is not always 
possible in a context of self-socialisation to ensure reasonable and successful agreements and 
decisions through differentiated moral communication. If the thorn in the side of the classic 
theory of socialisation is that it is socially deterministic, the banana peel of the theory of self-
socialisation is that it borders on subjectivism or even anarchy. Education as communication 
can only safeguard itself against anarchic education if it seriously implements the presump-
tion of the responsibility of the individual for their own decisions and in this way builds 
awareness of the full responsibility of individuals for their decisions and choices, for better or 
for worse. How? In the case of a small child, through emotional communication that ends in 
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forgiveness and a promise; in the case of older children, through communication according to 
the principles of “public reasonableness,” Responsibility is loyalty to oneself, which obliges 
us not to unburden ourselves of it or reset it at every moment. Responsibility is, in the end, 
responsibility for the other in a community, not in an atomised society.
We know from history that the education system has tended to cultivate obedience, stability and a 
number of other negative characteristics, if measured from the point of view of human autonomy 
and dignity. While it is impossible to deny the achievements that demonstrate how successful 
schools can be in overcoming many weaknesses in the life of society and the individual (issues 
such as xenophobia, discrimination against difference, dietary habits, vices, safe sex and so on), 
changing the views and even the political engagement of the environment is an entirely separate 
issue. We can agree with Amy Gutmann that it is necessary to “equip children with the intellec-
tual skills that are essential for an evaluation of lifestyles that differ from the lifestyle of their par-
ents” [32]. But to say this is merely to say “A.” We also need to say “B”—in other words, what this 
means for educational practice. This is the professional challenge of this century. I believe that the 
first step in this direction is taken by understanding education as communication, which gives 
preference to the pedagogical paradigm that understands the child/individual as the medium of 
education, which does not, however, mean the “centre of education.” Understanding education 
as communication further strengthens pedagogy’s basic mission, that of a scientific discipline 
that occupies itself primarily with questions of wise educational behaviour.
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